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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
mortgage. The taxpayer filed its franchise tax return and excluded from
the book value of its stock upon which the franchise tax was computed
the deferred income represented by its second mortgages. The Tax Com-
missioner contended that such deferred income should be included. The
Board of Tax Appeals referred to section 5733.05 of the Ohio Revised Code
which in substance provides that the book value of the stock shall be the
total value of the corporation's "capital, surplus, whether earned or un-
earned, undivided profits and reserves." Evidence was presented and ac-
cepted by the Board that the taxpayer's method of accounting was based
upon sound accounting principles. Accordingly, the Board found for the
taxpayer and held that deferred income, resulting from real estate sales
where second mortgages are given to the seller, is not includable as a part




Since Lloyd v. City of Toledo,' it has generally been assumed in Ohio
that the operation of a hospital by a municipal corporation, using munci-
pal funds, constitutes the performance of a governmental function. On
this basis, it has been further assumed that the municipality is immune
from suit for the negligence of its employees while in the scope of their
hospital employment.
The soundness of this view has recently been challenged by the Court
of Appeals for Cuyahoga County in Hyde v. City of Lakewood.' In the
Hyde case the court ruled that the mere operation of a hospital by a
municipal corporation is not a governmental function per se, thus raising
the probability that the issue will now have to be decided by the supreme
court.
In the Lloyd case plaintiff brought suit against the City of Toledo for
injuries sustained while a patient in that city's municipal hospital. The
trial court sustained defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings
and from that judgment plaintiff appealed. The Court of Appeals for
Lucas County affirmed the trial court's judgment on the theory that the
operation of an institution at municipal expense in the interest of public
health is the performance of a governmental function, regardless of the
1. 42 Ohio App. 36, 180 N.E. 716 (1931). A general discussion of this problem appears
in Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 203 (1952).
2. 175 N.E.2d 323 (Ohio Ct. App. 1961).
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fact that some patients pay for these accommodations and services. Once
this conclusion was reached the court invoked the immunity rule an-
nounced by the supreme court in Aldrich v. City of Youngstown.'
In the Hyde case the plaintiff-patient alleged injuries received while
a patient of the city's hospital and that such hospital was operated "for
gain, profit and compensation." Pursuant to Ohio Revised Code section
2311.041, the defendant municipal corporation moved for a summary
judgment as a matter of law on the theory that the operation of a hospital
by a municipality is a governmental function and that the city is there-
fore immune from suit. Defendant's motion was sustained and the case
was appealed to the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County. In revers-
ing the trial court's judgment, the court noted that Ohio Revised Code
section 715.37, providing for the establishment of municipal hospitals, is
permissive and not mandatory. Therefore, the mere operation of a muni-
cipal hospital is not a governmental function per se. The court relied
upon the governmental versus proprietary function test laid down by the
supreme court in Eversole v. City of Columbus.4
Because of plaintiff's allegation that the defendant hospital was oper-
ated for profit, the court stated that the city's immunity could be justified
only on the theory that the institution was operated for the protection of
health. The court relied upon the now often-quoted case of Avellone v.
St. John's Hosp.5 as being the rule in Ohio on the liability of non-charit-
able institutions. It would appear that the court distinguished between
tgovernmental per se" and proprietary function on the basis of whether
the institution was operated for profit or for charity.
The court's decision also sets up the question of whether the Avellone
holding applies to governmental as well as non-governmental institu-
tions.6
CARE OF SICK AND DISABLED
Two aspects of medical malpractice were discussed in cases reported
during the survey period. In Robinson v. Gatti7 the court held that to
maintain an action sounding in malpractice against a physician for failure
to discover and treat a broken rib and punctured lung plaintiff must
3. 106 Ohio St. 342, 140 N.E. 164 (1922).
4. 169 Ohio St. 205, 158 N.E.2d 515 (1959) (Syllabus 1). See also the language of
Zimmerman, J., to the effect that the modern view is to attach liability regardless of whether
the function is governmental or proprietary. Id. at 206-07, 158 N.E.2d at 517.
5. 165 Ohio St. 467, 135 N.E.2d 410 (1956).
6. Quaere, what further problem is presented where the hospital is jointly operated with
the county under authority of OHro REV. CoDE § 513.08? It is clear that, in absence of
statutory authorization, the county as an instrument of the state is immune from suit. Schaffer
v. Board of Trustees, 171 Ohio St. 228, 168 N.E.2d 547 (1960). Can one sue half a hos-
pital?
7. 115 Ohio App. 173, 184 N.E.2d 509 (1961).
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prove two elements. First, plaintiff must prove that there was negligence
or unskillfulness on the physician's part in not discovering and treating
injuries. Second, the act or acts of alleged malpractice must be the proxi-
mate cause of the injury to plaintiff and not merely an antecedent com-
plication.
Conway v. Ogier8 presented a somewhat related problem although it
arose out of a counterclaim to an action for medical services rendered.
The Court of Appeals for Franklin County stated that a cause of action
for loss of consortium resulting from medical malpractice arises in the
state where the malpractice occurs. However, on the authority of Corp-
man v. Boyer,' the court found that loss of consortium arising from mal-
practice is not controlled by the malpractice statute of limitations. Thus,
the husband's claim was brought prior to the running of the New York
statute of limitations on negligent injury.'
CHILDREN
Cases involving injury to children merit separate treatment if for no
other reason than by virtue of the fact that this jurisdiction does not rec-
ognize the doctrine of attractive nuisance." Ohio courts generally hold
a child to something akin to an adult standard of care for his own safety.
Ramsey v. Village of Piketon"2 is an excellent case in point. In that case,
a seven year old "licensee" was denied recovery for injuries sustained
when she stepped into an unguarded and uncapped tile which afforded
access to a water valve. Although the Court of Appeals for Pike County
found that the owner failed to give warning of the condition of the in-
strumentality, it was nevertheless exonerated by virtue of the fact that
there was no allegation of active negligence on his part. 3
Further proof that Ohio courts dealt harshly with minors during the
past year is found in Velioniskis v. Walter 4 and Boomershine v. Rice. 5
In the Velioniskis case the defendant, while backing out a driveway at
a speed of two or three miles an hour, struck the eleven year old plaintiff
who was walking along the sidewalk. The Court of Appeals for Cuya-
hoga County found that a verdict for the defendant was not against the
8. 115 Ohio App. 251, 184 N.E.2d 681 (1961).
9. 171 Ohio St. 233, 169 N.E.2d 14 (1960). See discussion in Smith, Survey of Ohio Law
-Torts, 12 W. Res. L. Rev. 564, 566 (1961).
10. It is interesting to note that while the husband could recover for loss of consortium,
the injured party's (his wife's) claim for malpractice was barred.
11. See Joyce v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 114 Ohio App. 51, 173 N.E.2d 692 (1961).
12. 115 Ohio App. 153, 184 N.E.2d 482 (1961).
13. Quaere, might not the presence of an unguarded, uncapped tile be regarded as a virtual
trap when measured against the tender years of the plaintiff in cases such as this?
14. 184 N.E.2d 418 (Ohio Ct. App. 1962).
15. 114 Ohio App. 267, 181 N.E.2d 723 (1960).
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great weight of evidence. The court further held that a charge of con-
tributory negligence to the jury was proper.
In the Boomershine case a six year old was struck when she emerged
from a double row of parked vehicles while crossing a street. Defendant
was operating his car at a speed of eight to twenty miles an hour. It was
held that it was not error for the trial court to refuse to give special in-
structions to the effect that the degree of care required of the appellee
depended on the apparent age of the child or that the appellee had a duty
to anticipate the behavior of children when the evidence disclosed that
the appellee had not seen the child before she was struck.
Mitchell v. Reinhardt' supported a claim for injuries to an eighteen
month old child struck when a truck driver failed to keep a proper look-
out to ascertain the presence of the toddler in vicinity of the vehicle.
Here the Court of Appeals for Brown County affirmed the proposition
that the duty to use ordinary care depends upon the circumstances in-
volved in a particular case. The court observed that a failure to keep a
proper lookout after the driver saw, or in exercise of proper care should
have seen, the child constituted actionable negligence.
INVASION OF RIGHT OF PRIVACY
Few areas of the law of injury to persons or relations have struggled
so hard to survive as the right of privacy. Inroads made by mass media,
often supported by community opinion, seem to have prevented any
orderly growth of the law of privacy. Thus LaCrone v. Ohio Bell Tel.
Co." offers hope to victorian scholars who, like Brandeis, are appalled by
the lack of judicial support for what was once regarded as an inalienable
right.
In the LaCrone case the Court of Appeals for Franklin County held
that a petition which alleges that defendant "deliberately, intentionally,
wilfully, unlawfully, and in reckless disregard of the rights of the plain-
tiff, did place a tap on plaintiff's telephone"'" states a cause of action.
Thus, it would appear that Ohio has taken a step ahead in securing the
right of privacy for its citizens.
PERSON ON PROPERTY OF ANOTHER
Suits brought by injured invitees and others provided the courts with
considerable problems in cases reported last year. Martinelli v. Cua'9
affirmed Ohio's long standing rule that a storekeeper's permitting a
natural accumulation of snow and ice to remain on his entrance steps does
16. 114 Ohio App. 175, 181 NXE.2d 53 (1960).
17. 114 Ohio App. 299, 182 NE.2d 15 (1961).
18. Id. at 299, 182 N.E.2d at 15.
19. 115 Ohio App. 151, 184 NXE.2d 514 (1962).
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not render him liable to a customer who slips and sustains injuries."0
Similarly, in Walker v. Busken2" the Court of Appeals for Hamilton
County found a bakery not liable for injuries sustained by a customer who
inadvertently struck her head on a merchandise shelf.
A case decided early in 1962, Coughlin v. Campbell,22 reaffirmed the
long standing proposition that a business invitee loses his preferred stand-
ing when he absents himself from the area reserved for trade. Plaintiff
visited the establishment for the purpose of seeing his father-in-law who
did woodworking in the basement in his spare time. Plaintiff was in-
jured during his uninvited trip to the basement. The court, noting the
nature of his trip, stated that when business visitors go where the public
is not ordinarily permitted, the proprietor's only obligation is not to will-
fully cause injury.
However, in McClure v. Neuman23 a pedestrian who met with mis-
adventure as a result of falling into a cellar was found to have a cause of
action against both the building owner and the painting contractor. Here
the court found that, where the owner of the building had employed the
painting contractor and the contractor negligently left the cellarway
open, the owner was jointly liable with the contractor.
The question of whether an occupant of a restaurant may recover
against a village and several oil companies for injuries sustained as a re-
sult of an explosion caused by gasoline entering sanitary sewers was de-
cided in Surman v. Ohio & Pa. Oil & Gasoline Co. 4  In finding for
the village the court noted that, in the absence of evidence that proper
inspection by the municipality of its sewers would have disclosed that
gasoline in dangerous quantities had leaked into sanitary sewers, the
fact that flood waters allegedly caused gasoline to be forced into a restau-
rant through a sanitary sewer would not support a claim of negligence
against the village. Here the problem of proximate cause was further
complicated by expert testimony to the effect that there were eight
possible channels by which gasoline could have entered the restaurant.
However, no creditable evidence was adduced to identify which of the
eight channels was the channel or channels by which gasoline allegedly
reached the building.25
20. See PROSSER, TORTS § 34 (2d ed. 1955).
21. 184 N.E.2d 769 (Ohio Ct. App. 1962).
22. 179 N.E.2d 367 (Ohio Ct. App. 1962).
23. 113 Ohio App. 422, 178 N.E.2d 621 (1961).
24. 183 N.E.2d 386 (Ohio Ct. App. 1962).
25. An explanation of the role of causation, particularly foreseeability and risk, is to be
found in HART & HOMORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW (1959). A parallel work by two
American scholars, Becht and Miller, published two years later suggests that American reason-





The right of a person to use his property as he sees fit was twice
tested last year.
In Sakler v. Huls8 plaintiff sought to enjoin the operation of a drag
strip within the corporate limits of Cincinnati. In supporting plaintiff's
cause of action the court found that, although the "drag strip" was in an
area zoned to permit such operation, this fact did not preclude an injunc-
tion against its operation as a nuisance. However, in City of Columbus
v. Becher 7 the court, perhaps more sympathetic to the needs of society,
found that the operation of an animal hospital within a municipality is
not a nuisance per se.
STREAMS AND BRIDGES
The question of the obligation of riparian owners to receive surface
drainage was again raised in Munn v. Horvitz Co. 8  The court found
that, where a surface drain sewer had been in open and notorious use for
thirty-seven years, an injunction would not lie against its enlargement.
In a turn about from the usual case where the owner of a vessel is
liable for damage to docks and piers, the Ohio Supreme Court, in Toledo
Terminal Rd. Co. v. Seaway Excursion Lines, Inc.,2 9 found for the defend-
ant owner. The action had been instituted by the bridge owner for dam-
age to the structure occasioned by defendant's vessel striking it. In reach-
ing its conclusion the court found that the operator of a swing bridge is
under a duty to look for approaching vessels and to do so at such a time
and manner as will constitute an effective inquiry as to whether any ves-
sels are in the vicinity.
LIABILITY WITHOUT FAULT
In Weaver v. Yoder"° the plaintiff, an adjoining property owner, ob-
tained relief on the theory of liability without fault by showing both dam-
ages and a continuous private nuisance. During the course of the trial
evidence was offered to the effect that the plaintiff's enjoyment of his
estate was materially reduced by blasting in the adjacent quarry. Judge
Lamneck, holding for Weaver, noted that vibrations, as opposed to flying
debris, may constitute a compensable harm."' Furthermore, the defend-
ant cannot exonerate himself by showing the exercise of due care.
26. 183 N.E.2d 152 (Ohio C.P. 1961).
27. 115 Ohio App. 239, 184 N.E.2d 617 (1961).
28. 184 N.E.2d 231 (Ohio Ct. App. 1962).
29. 173 Ohio St. 148, 180 N.E.2d 583 (1962).
30. 184 N.E.2d 622 (Ohio C.P. 1961).
31. Id. at 625, citing Louden v. City of Cincinnati, 90 Ohio St. 144, 158, 106 N.E. 970,
973-74 (1914).
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IMPLIED WARRANTY
The recent appearance of at least two new reporters32 covering prod-
ucts liability cases suggests the growing number of cases being litigated
in this area. Goldfarb v. Pailet" involved an action against a "muffler-
brake" shop for alleged faulty repairs made on plaintiff-appellant's ve-
hicle. The Common Pleas Court of Hamilton County entered judgment
for the defendant. Two errors were alleged: first, that the judgment was
against the weight of the evidence, and, second, that the special charge
was confusing to the jury. In reversing and remanding, the court care-
fully reviewed the record, calling attention to the sequence of events lead-
ing up to the accident. The reviewing court concluded that it was preju-
dicial error to give the special charge to the jury which called to their
attention other possible causes of the mishap, although there was "not
one shred of evidence in the record" to support a conclusion to the con-
trary.
An action by an employee of a roofing company, who was injured in
attempting to descend a fire escape, against the owner of the building
and the manufacturer-installer of the fire escape on the grounds that the
mishap resulted from the combined and concurrent negligence of both
defendants set the stage for Cornett v. Ficks Reed Co.34 In holding
for the plaintiff the court noted that where the manufacturer is guilty
of negligence in the manufacture of an article for use by the general pub-
lic and a member of that group is injured, the manufacturer may be liable
without privity of contract.3 5
The outdated rationale set forth in Winterbottom v. IWright" was
given new life in Miller v. Chrysler Corp." A truck driver sought re-
covery on the grounds of implied warranty of fitness and negligence. In
reversing in part and affirming in part, the court stated that in the "ab-
sence of privity between the plaintiff and defendant, an action predicated
on the theory of implied warranty cannot be maintained" in Ohio. 8 How-
ever, the court should be commended for pointing out that "if a different
32. HURSH, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY (1961); CCH PROD. LIAB. REP.
(1963).
33. 184 N.E.2d 827 (Ohio Ct. App. 1962).
34. 172 N.E.2d 183 (Ohio C.P. 1959), aHf'd, 175 N.E.2d 105 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960).
35. 172 N.E.2d at 185. The principle claim of negligence against the defendant Ficks Reed
Company was a failure to maintain its fire escape in a safe condition. OHIO REV. CODE §
3785.46 provides that "the owner of the building shall keep all fire ladders and fire escapes
in good repair ... "
36. 10 M & W 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842). Here plaintiff, a mail coachman,
was denied recovery on theory that a contract to supply mail coaches ran to the postmaster
general and did not inure to the benefit of injured.
37. 183 N.E.2d 421 (Ohio Ct. App. 1962).
38. Id. at 422.
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rule should be adopted in Ohio, the Supreme Court of Ohio is the proper
tribunal to make such change.
39
MOTOR VEHICLE INSURANCE
Several years ago Dean Leon Green set forth the arguments for over-
hauling our system of voluntary automobile liability coverage ° Among
the arguments advanced for "compulsory loss" insurance is the prospect
of doing away with the numerous defenses available to insurance car-
riers, which defenses may leave the assured virtually unprotected.
Late in 1962 the Ohio Supreme Court, in Weaver v. Ballard,41 af-
firmed the proposition that the burden of proving lack of cooperation
of the assured rests on the carrier and is not met where the named de-
fendant did not appear at trial and there was no showing that his carrier
sought his cooperation. Thus, the assured will be protected from an
insurer's alleged defense of failure to co-operate.
FEDERAL EMPLOYER'S LIABILITY ACT
Whether the death of an employee, resulting from his vehicle skid-
ding into the path of another vehicle when he had been directed to make
an automobile trip over snow covered highways, subjected his employer
to liability under the F.E.L.A. 2 was passed upon by the Ohio Supreme
Court in Spinello v. New York, Chicago & St. Louis Rd. Co.43 In affirm-
ing the trial court and reversing the court of appeals, the court found that
negligence was not established by defendant's foreman directing the em-
ployee to make the trip in view of the fact that only a short time earlier
the deceased had made the trip without mishap. Citing Wilkerson v.
McCarthy44 the court noted:
[I]t has been clearly established under such act [FE.LA.] that an
employer is not an absolute insurer of his employee's safety but is liable
as to such employee only for negligence4 5
Unanswered is the question of whether foreseeability or anticipation is an
essential element in establishing negligence within the meaning of F.E.-
L.A., for the Act specifically excludes proximate cause from the test of
causation by substituting the language "whole or in part."4
39. Ibid.
40. GREEN, TRAFFIC VIcrIMs (1958).
41. 174 Ohio St. 59, 186 N.E.2d 834 (1962).
42. Federal Employer's Liability Act, 35 Stat. 65 (1908), 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1952).
43. 173 Ohio St. 324, 181 NXE.2d 884 (1962).
44. 336 U.S. 53 (1949).
45. 173 Ohio St. 324, 329, 181 NE.2d 884, 888 (1962).
46. Federal Employer's Liability Act, 35 Stat. 65 (1908), 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1952).
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GUEST STATUTE
The anti-social nature of the guest statute47 has been treated before
and needs no additional comment. It suffices to say that its presence does
little to deter the reckless driver, less to punish the errant, and affords
the liability carrier the "perfect defense." Further, one might join with
Professor Willard K. Pedrick in asking:
[W]hy, for example, [do] automobile liability companies require
premium receipts in double the amount of the claims they pay. By
way of contrast, the Blue Cross Hospitalization Insurance organization
manages a payout rate of about 95 per cent of its receipts. 48
Botto v. Fischesser4 0 demonstrates that wanton misconduct under the
guest statute may consist of deliberately perverse behavior, with such
reckless and inexcusable conduct in driving the vehicle as to endanger
the safety of the occupants.
Substantially, the evidence of negligence was as follows: The speed of
the car when it started ... caused a spray of gravel; the speed, as the
car turned the bend was between thirty and forty miles per hour; it went
through a stop sign, skidded around a turn and crashed into a tree.50
Evidence was also adduced at trial, "that the driver of the car smiled
when his passengers remonstrated him with reference to speed."51
In Pahanish v. Everett," a court of appeals was faced with similar
testimony. The defendant spun the wheels on initial acceleration, failed
to stop before entering the highway, traveled about forty-five miles an
hour, and failed to negotiate a curve, thereby wrecking the car and in-
juring the plaintiff. The court, over protests of the injured, did not take
the defendant outside the protection of guest statute. However, the
Pahanish case was decided prior to the Botto case.
It would further appear that excess speed amounting to one hundred
miles an hour coupled with admonishments from a plaintiff does not con-
stitute willful or wanton conduct per se,58 although such evidence is for
the jury. However, in Russell v. Elkins54 it was held prejudicial to re-
fuse the defendant a judgment notwithstanding the verdict where the
claim for wrongful death could only be supported by allegations of intoxi-
47. OHIO REV. CODE § 4515.02.
48. Pedrick, On Civilizing the Law of Torts, 6 J. SoC'Y PUB. TEACHERS Op LAw 2, 3
(1961).
49. 174 Ohio St. 322, 189 N.E.2d 127 (1963).
50. 180 N.E.2d 30, 31 (Ohio Ct. App. 1962).
51. Ibid.
52. 186 N.E.2d 633 (Ohio Ct. App. 1962).
53. Phillips v. Ullmer, 114 Ohio App. 95, 180 N.E.2d 610 (1960).
54. 115 Ohio App. 341, 177 N.E.2d 355 (1961).
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cation and speeding. Cases such as these and others have prompted
one observer to write:
It is a tribute to the lobby system of legislation that in this country a
surgeon operating on a charity patient is bound to exercise ordinary
care but is permitted, should he drive his patient home from the hospital,
to abandon that standard and be subjected to liability only on proof of
gross negligence or wilful and wanton conduct.55
McManus v. Buskirk5  affirmed the theory that a volunteer who
offers to transport her classmates upon common business or solicitations,
the benefit of which she will share, owes her passenger a duty to exercise
ordinary care, and the guest statute is inapplicable.
ASSURED CLEAR DISTANCE
The question of what constitutes an assured dear distance was raised
inferentially in Applegate v. Harshman.7 The court found that the
assured dear distance rule is not applicable unless it is shown that the de-
fect is discernible in time to permit the driver to avoid it. Upon an ap-
peal prosecuted by the Board of Trustees of Southington Township"
the Court of Appeals for Trumbull County found that the township was
not entitled to instructions on the assured dear distance rule in the ab-
sence of a showing that the defect in the highway was sufficiently obvious
to permit the driver to avoid it. This reaffirms the proposition set forth
in Brown v. Oakland County9 to the effect that violation of a statutory
rule respecting assured dear distance does not preclude recovery for in-
juries occasioned by a defect in the road. Also worthy of note is the court's
willingness to sustain a sizeable verdict against a governmental subdi-
vision.
UNAVOIDABLE ACCIDENT
The question of what constitutes an unavoidable accident is not easily
understandable under Ohio law. Masterana v. Cashner0 called attention
to the fact that the defense of unavoidable accident is nothing more
than a denial of negligence. This defense, when offered to excuse negli-
gence per se, casts the burden of proof on defendant to establish that,
"without his fault and because of circumstances over which he had no
55. Pedrick, Taken For a Ride: The Automobile Guest and Assumption of Risk, 22 LA. L.
REv. 90, 92 (1961).
56. 183 N.E.2d 473 (Ohio C.P. 1962).
57. 186 N.E.2d 763 (Ohio Ct. App. 1962).
58. The Board was a defendant in the Applegate case.
59. 279 Mich. 55, 271 N.W. 550 (1937).
60. 114 Ohio App. 379, 182 NX.E.2d 853 (1959).
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control and which were not foreseeable, compliance with the statute was
rendered impossible."'"
Amplification of that theory is found in McClain v. Ford" where the
reviewing court held that it was reversible error to submit the issue of
"unavoidable accident" to the jury. Evidence was submitted to the effect
that it had been snowing for three hours and the highway was covered
with five to six inches of snow. The highway was described in the
defendant's own testimony as being "in very bad condition."
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
The Court of Appeals for Geauga County held in Mutual Benefit Ins.
Co. v. Reiss63 that skidding into the oncoming lane during a snow storm
does not excuse a violation of Ohio Revised Code section 4511.25."
The court further found that leaving a disabled car on the left berm of
the highway was not an act of contributory negligence so as to bar
plaintiff-appellee from recovery.
In Arnett v. Faulkner65 parking in a no parking zone in violation of
an ordinance was held not to be, as a matter of law, the proximate cause
of an accident occasioned when the vehicle was struck by a negligent
driver of a second vehicle.
EMERGENCY VEHICLES
Problems involving the use of motor vehicles in answer to an emer-
gency arose in three reported cases. The first, Weiss v. Tait,6" involved
a private ambulance. The decision affirmed the general rule that the
operator of an ambulance does not have an absolute right to "run traffic
signals." He has only a preferred right and is required to employ ordi-
nary care in exercising that right.
Traditionally the courts have stated the maxim: "The King can do
no wrong." As a result, a municipal body is not liable for the tortious
acts of its servants.6" The only major statutory modification of this
immunity has been in requiring municipal corporations to supervise and
control the public way, keeping it in repair and free from nuisance,"8
61. Id. at 382, 182 N.E.2d at 856.
62. 115 Ohio App. 69, 184 N.E.2d 530 (1961).
63. 184 N.E.2d 106 (Ohio Ct. App. 1961).
64. That statute deals with driving left of center.
65. 115 Ohio App. 461, 181 N.E.2d 295 (1962).
66. 116 Ohio App. 53, 184 N.E.2d 122 (1962).
67. All cases touching on municipal immunity seem to lead to Russell v. Men of Devon,
16 East. 305, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (K.B. 1788), where it was held that an action for injuries
resulting from a defective bridge must fail because the county itself had no money and the
legislature was not authorized to assess individuals as in the case of the "hue and cry."
68. OHIo REv. CODE § 723.01.
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and to hold them liable for harm caused by their servants while engaged
in the operation of any vehicle on the public highway. However, the
legislature has retained immunity for municipalities if the vehicle is
driven by members of the police department engaged in emergency police
duties or members of a fire department when answering an alarm.0 9
City of Worthington v. O'Dea7° affirmed the rule that the exemption
given police vehicles is a conditioned one. Inadequate use of a siren
and flashing red lights, coupled with absence of ordinary care in enter-
ing an intersection, constitutes contributory negligence as a matter of law.
In its opinion the court noted that Ohio Revised Code section 4513.21
requires that "the driver of the emergency vehicle sound such equipment
when it is necessary to warn pedestrians and other drivers of the approach
thereof."'" The question of whether the police officer was personally
liable was not raised. However, under the statute granting personal im-
munity, all that is required is that the officer shall be "engaged in the
operation of a motor vehicle while responding to an emergency call."72
In Rosenstiel v. Weigel7  defendant's automobile was struck by a
firetruck operated by plaintiff. The Court of Appeals for Hamilton
County found the lower court in error in removing the case from the
jury at close of plaintiff's evidence on theory of contributory negligence.
Plaintiff-appellant alleged the removal of his foot from the accelerator,
allowing compression to slow vehicle, while entering an intersection in
response to an alarm brought him under the provisions of section 4511.03.
Finding that reasonable minds might differ, the appellate court reversed
and remanded the cause.
What impact these cases will have on Ohio law remains doubtful.
In Eversole v. Columbus' the Ohio Supreme Court was frank to confess
that it is often impossible to distinguish what is governmental from what
is proprietary.
However, in view of the recent action of the Minnesota Supreme
Court, 75 prospectively overruling the doctrine of sovereign tort immunity
69. OHIo REV. CODE § 701.02. This is conditioned upon compliance with other statutes
such as OHIO REV. CODE § 4511.03.
70. 115 Ohio App. 375, 185 N.E.2d 323 (1962).
71. OHIo REV. CODE § 4513.21.
72. OHIO REV. CODE § 701.02. Note that the supreme court in McDermott v. Irwin, 148
Ohio St. 67, 69-70, 73 N.E.2d 86, 87 (1947), held: "it is a full defense to an action
against a policeman for negligence while engaged in the operation of a motor vehicle that
he was at the time of his alleged negligence responding to an emergency call." At least two
cases have broadly defined an emergency call. Rankin v. Sander, 96 Ohio App. 40, 121
N.E.2d 91 (1953), found that a "trouble run" was sufficient. Subsequently, Spencer v.
Heise, 107 Ohio App. 505, 158 N.X.2d 570 (1958), held that investigation of a body was
sufficient.
73. 184 N.E.2d 772 (Ohio Ct. App. 1962).
74. 169 Ohio St. 205, 158 N.X.2d 515 (1959).
75. Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist. No. 621, 118 N.W.2d 795 (Minn. 1962).
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subject to legislative action, the three Ohio decisions reviewed suggest a
need for judicial revision of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in Ohio.
DISABLED VEHICLES
Emergencies occasioned by the breakdown to automobiles have a
reputation for making bad law. Rice v. Yellow Cab Co.7" is no excep-
tion. The reviewing court found that although defendant taxi cab com-
pany's limousine stalled on a high level bridge due to a mechanical
breakdown, such was not the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries. The
independent intervening acts of another driver were found to be the
cause of the injury.
However, in Badurina v. Bolen,"7 an action by a truck driver against
a motorist for injuries sustained when the motorist struck the rear of the
stalled truck, the Court of Appeals for Franklin County held that the
truck driver could not request instructions on the emergency doctrine
where it appeared that the driver had been standing in front of the
truck for some time. However, in alighting from the vehicle and at-
tempting to crank it, he had not assumed the risk of injury.
CARE FOR SELF
In the ever advancing machine age, where technological progress has
made momentous strides in the protection and prolongation of human
life, there are still areas where progress and interest have not been evi-
denced. Historically, the motor vehicle was regarded as a dangerous
instrumentality when first introduced in Great Britain and on the con-
tinent. As the price of automobiles was brought within the reach of the
average man, the "street lobbies," often in the form of automobile clubs,
backed legislation to establish minimal protection for users of the public
way. It has been observed that since the triers of the fact are themselves
operators of motor vehicles, more often than not the judicial process
does little more than pace legislation.
However, four cases reported during the survey period offer hope for
the pedestrian. Hardy v. Crabbe"8 held that, although allegations of
intoxication and negligence may be stated in the petition and opening ar-
gument, examination of plaintiff as to whether she could have seen the
vehicle had she looked was prejudicial error, since she was in the cross-
walk. Similarly, in Gottlieb v. Liptak," proceeding across the street in
reliance on a "green light" without looking for or at the traffic was held
not to be contributory negligence as a matter of law.
76. 179 N.E.2d 139 (Ohio Ct. App. 1961).
77. 114 Ohio App. 478, 183 N.E.2d 241 (1961).
78. 114 Ohio App. 218, 181 N.E.2d 483 (1961).
79. 183 NE.2d 145 (Ohio Ct. App. 1961).
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